





FILE:

LIN-02-143-50815

Office: NEBRASKA SERVICE CENTER

Date:

W/ 1 4 2004

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION:

Immigrant petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional pursuant to section

203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

Robert P. Wiemann, Director Administrative Appeals Office A STATE OF THE STA

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Nebraska Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a restaurant. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a business manager. As required by statute, a Form ETA 750, Application for Alien Employment Certification approved by the Department of Labor, accompanied the petition. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(ii), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who hold baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states, in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, the day the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor. See 8 CFR § 204.5(d). Here, the Form ETA 750 was accepted for processing on April 17, 2001. The proffered wage as stated on the Form ETA 750 is \$55,000 annually.

With the petition, the petitioner submitted a copy of the petitioner's financial report for 2001 and evidence of the beneficiary's MBA and work experience.

Because the evidence submitted was insufficient to demonstrate the petitioner's continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, on July 1, 2002, the director requested additional evidence pertinent to that ability. In accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), the director specifically requested that the petitioner provide copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements to demonstrate its continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

In response, the petitioner submitted Form 1120 Corporate tax return for the petitioner for the year 2001. The tax returns reflect the following information for that year:

	2001
Net income	\$4,554
Current Assets	\$9,674
Current Liabilities	\$4,743
Net current assets	\$4,931

In addition, counsel submitted copies of the petitioner's checking account statements for the period from January 31, 2002 through May 29, 2002, statements from a second account for the period January 31, 2002 through June 30, 2002, and, statements from a "Small Business Checking" account for the period January 1, 2002 through July 31, 2002. Counsel also submitted the petitioner's owner's 2001 Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return and a promissory note indicating that the petitioner's owner and his spouse loaned \$49,001 to Siam 99, Inc.

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, or that the beneficiary had the required experience listed on the Form ETA 750, and, on March 18, 2003, denied the petition.

On appeal, counsel asserts that the repayment of the loan from Siam 99, Inc. to the petitioner provides more than sufficient funds to pay the proffered wage. Counsel asserts that the petitioner's owner owns 100% of two additional restaurants and that the revenue from each of the affiliated restaurants is collectively available to all three restaurants. Counsel states that the "businesses are so interrelated and within the same industry that their revenue and assets must all be considered together." Counsel further asserts that the petitioner is submitting a letter that demonstrates that the beneficiary has sufficient "related experience" to satisfy the experience requirement on the Form ETA 750.

Counsel submits a financial statement reflecting the petitioner's owner and his spouse's personal assets and a letter, copies of three separate stock certificates indicating that the petitioner's president owns 1000 shares of Sala Thai, Inc.; 60,000 shares of Sala Thai II, Inc.; and, 1000 shares of Ruin Thai, L.L.C. Counsel submits a letter indicating the petitioner's president's ownership of the three restaurants, and an employment verification letter signed by Supanporn Suwannavit, General Manager, indicating that the beneficiary worked at the Suwannavit Hotel as an assistant public relations manager and assistant manager during 1989, 1990, and as a marketing manager during 1998 and 1999.

The first issue in this proceeding is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary met the petitioner's qualifications for the position as stated in the Form ETA 750 as of the petition's priority date.

A labor certification is an integral part of this petition, but the issuance of a labor certification does not mandate the approval of the relating petition. To be eligible for approval, a beneficiary must have all the education, training, and experience specified on the labor certification as of the petition's priority date. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d). *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Act. Reg. Comm. 1977). In this instance, it is April 17, 2001.

The Form ETA 750 indicated that the position of business manager required a bachelor's degree and 2 years of experience in the related occupation of management, public relations or marketing.

On appeal, counsel submitted an employment verification letter indicating that the beneficiary worked at the Suwannavit Hotel from 1989 to 1990 as Assistant Public Relations Manager and from 1998 to 1999 as Marketing Manager. A review of the ETA Form 750 reveals that the beneficiary claims employment from January 1989 to November 1990 and from February 1998 to January 1999. This is a total of 35 months. The record contains no evidence to refute the beneficiary's claim. Therefore, since the employment is in a related field specified on the ETA 750, it is concluded that the petitioner has overcome this portion of the director's objections.

The second issue relates to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. In the instant case, the petitioner did not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary the full proffered wage in 2001.

If the petitioner does not establish that it employed and paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during that period, CIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ubeda v. Palmer, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Counsel's reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient. In K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that CIS had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that the Service, now CIS, should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income.

Nevertheless, the petitioner's net income is not the only statistic that can be used to demonstrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. If the net income the petitioner demonstrates it had available during that period, if any, added to the wages paid to the beneficiary during the period, if any, do not equal the amount of the proffered wage or more, CIS will review the petitioner's assets. We reject, however, any argument that the petitioner's total assets should have been considered in the determination of the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner's total assets include depreciable assets that the petitioner uses in its business. Those depreciable assets will not be converted to cash during the ordinary course of business and will not, therefore, become funds available to pay the proffered wage. Further, the petitioner's total assets must be balanced by the petitioner's liabilities. Otherwise, they cannot properly be considered in the determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. Rather, CIS will consider *net current assets* as an alternative method of demonstrating the ability to pay the proffered wage.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner's current assets and current liabilities.\(^1\) A corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1(d) through 5(d). Its year-end current liabilities are shown on lines 15(d) through 17(d). If a corporation's end-of-year net current assets are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage out of those net current assets. The petitioner's net current assets during the year in question, 2001, however, were only \$4,931. As such, the director's failure to consider the petitioner's net current assets did not prejudice the petitioner's cause.

The petitioner has not demonstrated that it paid any wages to the beneficiary during 2001. In 2001, the petitioner shows a net income of only \$4,554, net current assets of only \$4,931 and has not, therefore, demonstrated the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not demonstrated that any other qualifying funds were available to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner has not, therefore, shown the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 2001.

Counsel's reliance on the balances in the petitioner's bank accounts is misplaced. First, bank statements are not among the three types of evidence, enumerated in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2), required to illustrate a petitioner's ability to pay a proffered wage. While this regulation allows additional material "in appropriate cases," the petitioner in this case has not demonstrated why the documentation specified at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) is inapplicable or otherwise paints an inaccurate financial picture of the petitioner. Second, bank statements show the amount in an account on a given date, and cannot show the sustainable ability to pay a proffered wage. Third, no evidence was submitted to demonstrate that the funds reported on the petitioner's bank statements somehow reflect additional available funds that were not reflected on its tax return, such as the cash specified on Schedule L that will be considered below in determining the petitioner's net current assets.

Counsel's reliance on the assets of the petitioner's owner, including any repayment of the referenced promissory note, and other related corporations is not persuasive. A corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity from its owners or stockholders. *Matter of Aphrodite Investments Limited*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980); *Matter of M-*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958; A.G. 1958). CIS will not consider the financial resources of individuals or entities who have no legal obligation to pay the wage. *See Sitar Restaurant v. Ashcroft*, 2003 WL 22203713, *3 (D. Mass. Sept. 18, 2003).

The petitioner failed to submit evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it had the ability to pay the proffered wage during the salient portion of 2001 or subsequently during 2002. Therefore, the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date. The petitioner has not overcome this portion of the director's objections.

According to *Barron's Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), "current assets" consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. "Current liabilities" are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and salaries). *Id.* at 118.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.